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At ftrst glance, the work ofMartin Heidegger would 
seem to be an unlikely source for ethical reflection on 
our relation to animals. First, it has long been regarded 
as problematical that Heidegger-whose work seems 
otherwise to have a comprehensive scope-did not write 
an "ethics" in the modem sense of the term, Le., did 
not arrive at a theory of moral obligation on the model 
of Kant or Mill or his own compatriot and early animal 
rights advocate, Leonard Nelson. Second, Heidegger's 
published works-including his recently published 
lectures, lecture courses, and seminars in the German 
Collected Works-say virtually nothing about how 
animals in particular ought to be treated. Third, when 
he does discuss animals, his purpose is usually to argue 
vigorously for a fundamental difference between them 
and human beings, even maintaining that there is an 
ontological "abyss" between humans and animals. 
There is, however, a countervailing consideration. 
Although his writings are not often actually read within 
the fteld, Heidegger has begun to be cited so often in 
the literature of deep ecology that he may be said to 
have attained a semi-canonical status, and the interest-
and secondary literature-in the relation between 
Heidegger and deep ecology are beginning to prolifemte 
prodigiously. Put simply, it is being argued that 
Heidegger (a) provides an analysis and diagnosis of 
Western thought and culture, and a critique of modem 
technology, which taken together allow us to understand 
why we are faced with the present environmental crisis, 
and (b) that he shows ways of drawing upon different 
possibilities inherent in Western thought and culture-
asking us neither to take up the practice of Taoism, nor 
to embmce NativeAmerican cosmogonies-that would 
lead to a far more salutary relation between humankind 
and the natural world. And although there have been 
historic tensions between the "deep ecology" and 
"animal rights" emphases in environmental ethics, any 
views prescribing a fundamental alteration in our 
relation to the natural environment must still be assumed 
prima facie to hold important implications for our 
treatment of animals. 
Working from this latter point of view, I shall today 
argue ftrst, that rather than neglecting the subject, 
Heidegger's thinking offers us the elements for an 
alternative understanding ofethics that is especially well 
suited to the task offmding better ways of getting along 
with other residents of this planet. Second, I shall 
maintain that although Heidegger offers no speciftc 
prescriptions regarding our treatment of animals, there 
are some things that we can extrapolate from his 
writings with conftdence. Third, I shall propose that 
Heidegger's work provides us with a good occasion to 
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question the widely held views that fundamental 
distinctions drawn between humans and animals lead 
to the mistreatment of animals, and correspondingly, 
that maintaining the absence of radical difference is 
necessarily conducive to the welfare of animals. 
I. Heidegger's Question of Being and 
Its Implications for Ethics 
In order to see what kind of ethics might follow from 
Heidegger's thought, it is necessary to proceed from 
his concern for what the tradition has tenned "ontology." 
To simplify matters a great deal, Heidegger can be seen 
as challenging the entire sense of being-the entire 
sense and experience of what it means to say that 
something or someone "is"-which has come to 
predominate in the West. Beginning with the ancient 
Greeks, and progressing until the present time, we have 
overemphasized "presence" and transparency as a 
model for comprebension, while underemphasizing and 
even castigating absence and opacity. But while the 
Greeks valorized the clear and manifest purity of fonn 
(Plato) or the triumphant sway of the actual (Aristotle), 
for us today the Western thirst for presence takes the 
shape of a demand for objectivity in modern science-
the status of being an object laid out for view by a 
(human) subject-and availability as a resource (and 
ultimately as a consumable inventory) in modem 
technology. Heidegger argues, then, that what counts 
for us as something that "is" is the scientific object and 
the technological stockpile. 
In order to count for us today as having being-that 
is, as being something that is at all extant-an entity 
must be secured as either an object of scientific 
knowledge or, better yet, as a stored "resource" on call 
for eventual consumption or further production. 
Moreover, Heidegger sees this modern ontology as the 
outcome of a virtually inexorable progression that 
begins with the ancient Greeks: starting with Plato's 
vision of purely intelligible and eternally unchanging 
fonns (that is, being as completely present and always 
present) and Aristotle's emphasis on actuality (that is, 
being as present as well in this and that entity), Western 
thought and existence has emphasized presence at the 
expense of absence. Against this, Heidegger maintains 
that the character ofpresence is not exhaustive of being, 
that absence and withdrawal and opacity are characters 
of being that are not only equiprimordial with presence 
but even possess a certain priority. The Greek word, 
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for example, that we translate as truth is a-letheia: 
rendered literally, un-concealment or un-hiddenness, 
implying that prior to the onset of Greek philosophy 
and the metaphysics of presence, a primacy of 
hiddenness and concealment was acknowledged. Truth 
as unconcealment is always wrested away from a prior 
hiddenness (whether it be that of error, dissemblance, 
or oblivion) to which it is destined as well to return. 
Before, after, and in the midst ofpresence and clarity 
and intelligibility, Heidegger maintains, lies recalci-
trance, withdrawal, darkness, mystery. 
But does this not prove that Heidegger's critics are 
right in branding him a mystagogue and irrationalist? 
On the contrary, it calls for all the greater vigilance on 
the part of reason (that it not be seduced unknowingly 
by unreason) and passion in the quest for truth (that it 
must always again be fought for and won). Like Kant, 
Heidegger seeks to limit and define (rather than bound 
and restrict) reason and intelligibility; but whereas Kant 
fixed the recalcitrance of being in the noumenal realm, 
Heidegger wants us to note how it seeps into every kind 
of clarity and overtness-to see that overtness is never 
total and explanation is never final, that mountains and 
people and rivers and animals are always more than 
what we make them out to be-and more than what we 
wish to make ofthem as well. Entities are always more 
than the uses we fmd for them, more than the lucidity 
of theory can reveal, more than experience can exhaust, 
and this is so not as a matter of fact but necessarily, 
inevitably. This view prescribes, if you will, a sort of 
ontological humility in the face of the integrity of 
beings, an ontological deference toward their resistance 
to being reduced to our knowledge of them and our 
uses for them, and above all their resistance to that all-
encompassing network of supply and regulation that is 
modern technology. Heidegger's German word for this 
comportment which lets entities be what they are, while 
at the same time relinquishing the claim of technology 
to determine the being of entities, is Gelassenheit. 
"We are not dealing here with just any question," 
Socrates tells Glaucon at an important point in Plato's 
dialogue on justice, "but with the question of how life 
is to be lived." If we understand ethics not in its 
narrower, modern sense-as a theory of moral 
obligation-but in this broader sense of the ancients-
as reflection on how life as a whole is to be lived-
then Heidegger's Gelassenheit is as much an ethic as it 
is an epistemology. Gelassenheit is releasement-a 
letting-go that is at the same time a letting-be. Letting-go 
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of technology and its ontological ambitions to bring 
entities into unhiddenness as stock and resource-not 
atavistically abandoning technology but letting-go of 
its compulsiveness and seductiveness, its claims to offer 
notjust convenience but revelation and salvation-such 
a letting-go is a letting-be of entities: not a neglect or 
ignoring of them Gust letting them alone) butapositive 
allowing of entities to be what they are, a clearing of 
space for beings to reveal themselves of their own 
accord, as well as to make manifest their resistance to 
total manifestation. 
Such a comportment toward entities, as a manner 
of being-in-the-world amidst entities, can be 
characterized as a mode of inhabiting the world. And 
Heidegger maintains that this sense of a mode of 
inhabitation is in fact the primal and primary meaning 
of ethics, beginning with the Greek word ethos which 
derived its sense of "custom," "habit," and "character" 
from its earlier meanings of "accustomed place," and 
abode. Heidegger, then, opens up a new space for ethical 
thought by thinking ethics as ethos, i.e., as mode of 
dwelling or inhabitation, and by thinking Gelassenheit 
(releasement or letting-be) as a mode of what he calls 
in the "Letter on Humanism" "primal" or "original 
ethics," Le., a dwelling or primary mode of comport-
ment so basic that it would precede the distinction of 
theory and practice, and hence be as much a knowing 
as a doing-and vice versa. The most basic question of 
ethics is the question of how it is that we are to inhabit 
the world, the question of how we are to comport 
ourselves within the world-whether our primary 
bearing in relation to entities is to be one of self-assertive 
will to control and domination or one of pause and 
listening and letting-be. 
n. A Heideggerean Ethic of Dwelling, Saving, and 
Letting-be, and Its Implications 
for Our Treatment of Animals 
What implications would this have, then, for the 
question of how human beings ought to treat animals? 
How would this kind of thinking, were it to be embraced, 
alter our practices toward animals? Before dealing with 
this question, two brief qualifications are in order. First, 
we are not justified in expecting from Heidegger an 
ethical "theory" which we could then straightforwardly 
"apply" as a theoretical foundation for specific mM ll 
judgments. That distance which thought would assume 
over against a world of objects, and that positing of 
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foundations on the basis of which entities would be 
measured and judged, are both principal maneuvers of 
what Heidegger disavows as the "subjectivity" ofmodem 
thought which aims to master and dominate what it 
encounters. What is needed, rather, is a thoughtful 
dwelling in the midst of thmgs, not the detachment of 
theoria which would set them up as objects-and 
ultimately, he argues, as resources. 
Second, we should also note that after the political 
fiasco of his university rectorship during the early 
thirties, Heidegger refrained from making public 
pronouncements on specific social and moral issues, 
preferring instead to engage his thinking with issues at 
a more radical level of inquiry. In my view, this was a 
wise and happy decision, for it has served to free his 
thought from the stodgy, conservative, and provincial 
limits of his own biography and psychological 
makeup--a freeing which usually accrues to the work 
of major thinkers only after greater passage of time 
(think of the near century it took for Nietzsche's thought 
to come into its own) or a violent reshaping (think of 
the appropriation ofHegel by the Young Hegeleans and 
Marx). But at the same time, Heidegger's restraint puts 
us (as it should) on our own in exploring its practical 
implications. For better or worse Heidegger himself 
offers us as many specific prescriptions on how we 
should treat animals as he does on how we should treat 
other people, and that is precisely none at all. 
This being said, we can with some caution 
extrapolate what we could term an onto-ethical 
imperative that is implicit in Heidegger's work, and 
even more cautiously, we could formulate it along the 
following lines: in our thinking, and speaking, and 
acting, to allow to those entities with which we concern 
ourselves those modes ofcoming-into-presence, as well 
as self-witholding and withdrawal, that they would show 
forth of their own accord. Parallel to St. Paul, Heidegger 
would seem to be telling us: "LET BE, and do what 
thou will." And like Kant, he would seem to be implying 
that we should treat always at the same time as an end 
and never merely as a means, but with an important 
difference, for the Heideggerean injunction would not 
be limited to persons-indeed, it would not even be 
limited to sentient beings-but would extend to entities 
as a whole. Heidegger enjoins us explicitly to "save the 
earth," Le., in the face of modern technology and its 
subjugation of the planet to the status of gas station and 
warehouse, to allow entities to retain and reassert their 
darkness and density and reticence to disclosure, their 
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"earthliness," as he puts it. In a technological age, 
Gelassenheit is above all a letting-be of the earthly. 
"Earth" is for Heidegger not just, or even primarily, 
a planet in cosmic space, but rather the locus of closure 
and self-seclusion that Western metaphysics-and 
modern science and ~echnology, to the extent that they 
are metaphysical successors-has tried to dominate. 
Earth is for each entity that element from which it 
emerges into appearance, and into which it continually 
withdraws. It is not only the "ground" in the literal sense 
of"soil" but also that which in every instance engenders 
what emerges: the earth is precisely that from which 
self-emergence arises, into which it continually 
withdraws, and which withholds and preserves the 
possibility of both. Viewed phenomenologically, it is 
the solidity of a colored object which can support a play 
of light and color only because of its very density and 
which can present one side of itself only by withholding 
another side from view. The earth is not only that in 
which plants take root and upon which houses are built 
butalso human and animal bodies, the sound ofa spoken 
word or the script of a written text, the bronze or clay 
which upholds a sculpted surface. In each case, the earth 
is what bears and gives rise to what comes to light only 
by remaining intrinsically dark itself. Earth is that which 
shelters and supports, "the serving bearer, blossoming 
and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up 
into plant and animal" (Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking," p. 149). To save the earth is to allow to each 
and every entity the grounds for its own self-emergence. 
But this reticent self-emergence is the very phenomenon 
which, according to Heidegger, the early Greeks called 
physis! To save the earth, then, is to allow to each entity 
its "nature" in both dominant senses of the concept, 
"nature": both its characteristic way-to-be, and also its 
naturalness in emerging from itself, rather than 
emerging solely as the work of artifice or production. 
The mode of self-emergence of certain kinds of entities, 
however, is of special interest to us, attracting and 
arresting our attention. In zoe, which we translate as 
"life," physis displays an intensified self-emerging, one 
that is not only a self-unfolding but also a self-opening 
that enters into the open alongside us. 
But what then, specifically, about animals? Should 
we eat them? Or wear them? Or experiment on them? 
Or not? When these questions are juxtaposed alongside 
Heidegger's thoughts of "the earthly" and "self-
emergence," the ontological violence of technological 
domination is brought to light as in almost no other 
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instance. The food and apparel industries, as well as 
the mass use of animals in laboratories, are especially 
well-suited to illustrating the grim and uncanny power 
of technology as a manner of revealing entities and as a 
mode of comportment toward them: through these 
practices we can see most vividly what it means to say 
that technology violates the earthy self reserve, and 
hence the very nature, of beings over which it holds 
sway. Had we time today, a Heideggerean gloss (chapter 
by chapter) of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation would 
be most appropriate! What it would show, I believe, is 
that the impact of that book comes not primarily from 
the terrible animal suffering that it documents, for as 
critics such as J. Baird Callicott have been quick to note, 
animals suffer terribly in the wild as well. What is 
uniquely compelling in Singer's careful documentation 
of the technological processing of living beings is 
precisely the ontological horror which grips the reader, 
in the face of that very technological processing of life. 
Why is it that the suffering of the anemic and immobile 
veal calves induces in us a deep revulsion which all the 
combined PBS nature-show footage ofpredators tearing 
apart their prey could never come close to generating? 
Is it just the fact that humans, and not wolves or raptors, 
are in this case the agents of suffering and death? Or is 
it not more akin to the horror first evoked by Mary 
Shelley's novel, the horror at life usurped, mechanized, 
and appropriated-yet in this case without the frenzy 
of demented genius but, rather, arising from a 
comportment which takes upon itself nothing more 
demonic than the dull patina of business as usual and, 
thus, is all the more horrible. 
Singer presents us with visions that provoke our 
outrage. He shows us, for example, vast, dimly lighted 
sheds with tens of thousands ofchickens packed so tightly 
together in cages (as many as four or even five birds per 
square foot) that they are nearly immobile, and with all 
oftheir natural urges so entirely frustrated that they would 
turn to cannibalism were their beaks notalready removed. 
If such practices resulted from negligence, or savage 
cruelty, we could at least understand them as deriving 
from human personality disorders, but in fact they are 
often the norm and result from openly espoused positions 
such as one that Singer cites from a British agronomy 
journal: "The modem layer is, after all, only a very 
efficient converting machine, changing the raw 
material-feedingstuffs-intothe fmished product-the 
egg-less, ofcourse, maintenance requirements" (Animal 
Liberation, p. 103). Even more appalling are visions of 
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laboratory studies and experiments in which mammals, 
and often primates, are coolly tortured to death or driven 
mad for the sake of fmdings so trivial that they possess 
utterly no interest for anything more than idle curiosity-
labs in which, as one horrified reporter put it, "the life of 
an animal has no meaning beyond the immediate purpose 
of experimentation" (Ibid., p. 63). "How," Singer asks, 
"can these things happen? How can a man who is not a 
sadist spend his working day heating an unanesthetized 
dog to death, or driving a monkey into a lifelong 
depression, and then remove his white coat, wash his 
hands, and go home to dinner with his wife and children?" 
(Ibid., p. 62). 
Given Heidegger's critiques of modem science and 
technology, it is perhaps not saying enough to say that 
such practices are "wrong." Rather, they give us 
glimpses into the outer extremities of an ontological 
errancy become so total that it has lost touch entirely 
with any innocence in the face of being-has severed 
itself from any sense of delight in the self-emergence 
of the natural-so obsessed has it become with 
efficiency, and control, and explanation. What 
Heidegger allows us to see is that it is not enough to 
say, in good utilitarian fashion, that such practices result 
in needless pain for sentient sufferers. What, then, 
should be said, if it is not enough to say that such things 
are "wrong"? Already I have suggested that for 
Heidegger such things are "horrifying." But what is the 
horrifying? According to Heidegger, "the Horrifying 
[das Entsetzende] is that which sets 'everything that 
is' outside of what was formerly its own way-to-be 
[Wesen or "nature" in the frrst sense noted above] "("The 
Thing," p. 166). Technology (whether in the laboratory 
or the factory fann or the totalitarian state or the modem 
war machine) sets upon entities to set them up as 
resources and raw materials, which it then sets in order 
for consumption and further production. But this is at 
the same time horrifying: "everything thatis"-people, 
animals, lands and seas, subatomic particles and genetic 
codes-gets "set outside of," displacedfrom, or stripped 
of what was before this its own mode ofself-emergence, 
its very nature. (For those who have not read Singer's 
book, I can relay to you that his discussion of Harlow's 
experiments on primates with maternal deprivation-
complete with "monster mothers" who brutalize and 
murder their trusting charges-raises horror to levels 
usually attained only in the cinema.) 
What about the animals? Should we eat them? Or 
wear them? Or experiment on them? I think the only 
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consistent answer, deriving from Heidegger's approach, 
is: given the way we typically go about doing these 
things, no! One of the most notable features ofSinger's 
book is its effectiveness in demonstrating how trivial 
are the gains to be obtained by all this suffering and 
horror: how trivial the experimental results, how petty 
the decrease in the cost of eggs, how easily more decent 
methods could be implemented. This is not only material 
for a utilitarian calculus: perhaps more importantly, it 
is significant evidence that Heidegger is right in his 
claim (reiterated recently by Thomas Berry in his book, 
The Dream of the Eanh) that we are bewitched and 
enchanted by modem technology, that we look to it for 
our salvation, that efficiency and domination and control 
are pursued blindly at any cost, and right that we need 
to let go of this obsession. 
But what about gentler, more merciful ways of 
raising animals or more intelligent and significant and 
compassionate experiments than really might teach us 
something? Here is where, I believe, Heidegger leaves 
us on our own. We are, let us now grant, to let animals 
be, allow them to enter into the full display of their 
own ways to be, let them come into appearance from 
themselves, without betraying their inherent self-
withholding. Who, then, lets them be, and who does 
not? Not the agribusiness entrepreneur nor the glib 
researcher nor even the administrators at my own 
College who remove alligators from the ponds when 
they reach a certain size, for to let an alligator "be" is 
surely to let it be .,. dangerous. But I see no way, from 
Heidegger's point of view, to maintain that no human 
use ofanimals lets them be. On the contrary, the reverent 
and risky right of passage in which a Native American 
youth procures an eagle feather seems to me to let the 
eagle show forth its own splendor just as much as does 
the awe of the Audobon Society observer. That we are 
at long last replenishing some of our wild areas with 
wolves seems to be a most wonderful letting-be of 
canine physis but so, too, is the very evident zest and 
exuberance with which a dog performs extraordinary 
tricks for its trainer. Heidegger leaves us here to work 
out our relation to animals historically, as our own way-
to-be unfolds alongside theirs, and relative to our own 
cultural sensibilities and intuitions, and, of course, our 
customs regarding cruelty and compassion. What I have 
called his onto-ethical imperative is, it seems to me, 
capable of many sorts of elaborations, and it is in this 
sense that I believe it is meaningful to say that Heidegger 
is an historicist. 
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III. Does It Take an Animal to Be Good to One? 
There is, however, a final issue to be confronted 
concerning the bearing of Heidegger's thought on our 
treatment of animals. Contrary to most environ-
'. mentalists and animal right activists, who feel that it 
is important to see humanity as an animal species, 
Heidegger rejects human animality altogether. And 
contrary to an even larger number, rather than seeing 
human beings as simply component parts of nature, 
he sees them as those beings through whom (but not 
necessarily, I want to add immediately,for the sake of 
whom) nature comes to light and emerges into 
presence. Since Heidegger has come under some 
recent criticism for these views, it seems worthwhile 
to pose the question explicitly: is there a clear and 
direct relationship, as it is often assumed, between how 
we treat animals and whether-or the extent to 
which-we see ourselves as animals? 
To respect and/or treat well members of class L, it 
is held, one must oneself be-Dr see oneself as-a 
member of L. But from this, it would follow that to 
respect the French, I would need to be French as well; 
to treat babies well and respect thein, I would have to 
be a baby (or at least see myself as one); to respect 
works of art or treat them well, I must myself be a work 
of art, and so on for shop tools, African violets, or 
Siamese cats and Bengal tigers. But since this is so 
clearly absurd, we must ask why this kind of assumption 
prevails at all. Surely there must be some other 
reasoning underlying this widespread claim and belief. 
There are grounds for believing that it has evolved 
from a peculiar extension of thinking about interracial 
justice. (Indeed, Aldo Leopold-patron of deep 
ecology- draws heavily on this analogy). If I deny to 
members ofother races the status of being human, then 
I am likely (indeed, certain!) to mistreat them. And the 
same goes, it might be said, for my beliefs about 
members of other species: if I deny an identity with 
them, then here, too, it seems I will be prone to mistreat 
them-and in fact, as would be the case with my beliefs 
about other races, the suspicion would arise that my 
belief is held precisely in order to justify my mistreating 
them. But this only seems to make sense. Members of 
other races precisely are human and deserving of 
whatever any human deserves, while animals simply 
are not human and in fact represent in the analogy just 
that status which it would be wrong to accord members 
of other races. It could, of course, be argued that what 
justice requires is not a so-called promotion of animals 
to human status but adefacto demotion ofhuman beings 
to animal status. But in that case, demands for racial 
justice (viz., demands to be accorded as fully human) 
would become incoherent. 
Finally, taken simply as an empirical claim, it is 
questionable to state that class identity (I mean here, 
of course, ontical and logical class) precludes 
mistreatment. On the contrary, civil wars are typically 
more merciless than wars between nations; gang 
violence (generally between members of the same 
race, socio-economic group, and neighborhood) is 
unusually brutal; and domestic violence (Le. within 
the family, where group identity is at its highest and 
least controversial) often reaches alarming intensity 
and, in fact, accounts for a large portion of all violence 
in society. 
To say simply that people are animals is, I believe, 
of no necessary help to the animals themselves. Yet 
neither I-nor, I think, Heidegger-would maintain 
an utter discontinuity. I experience both within myself 
as well as without that physis rises up always out of 
the darkness of earth. In both cases it commands 
respect if I allow it to be what it is, and it is just this 
letting-be that Gelassenheit prescribes. And I do not 
see how it is possible to respect this within, yet not 
without-Dr vice versa. 
So, in summary: 
Against the Western view that explicability and 
calculability are the salient characters of the real, 
Heidegger maintains that more primary is a self-
concealing and self-withdrawing character, Le.. that 
being is better grasped as also inherently "mysterious" 
than as purely intelligible. He understands nature not 
solely as mechanism but in terms of the Greek physis 
or "self-witholding self-emergence," that which come 
forth and recedes of its own accord, and understands 
life as zoe, "intensified self-emergence." The 
attunement to this sense of being engenders respect 
and even reverence for living things. Such an 
attunement is not unlike the relation of many 
indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans, to both 
domestic and wild animals: even when their treatment 
of animals is harsh, it is never lacking in respect for 
the mystery that is at play in all life. Yet Heidegger 
arrives at this position from a critique of Western 
thought and practice that is entirely immanent and, 
hence, accessible to us in ways that non-Western views 
may never be. 
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